Episode 49. When Politics Becomes Prophecy: Trump, Faith and the New Apocalyptic

Most explanations of Trump’s support reach for economics or culture. Daniel Nilsson DeHanas argues that both miss what is actually happening in the room at a rally. He studies populism as a spiritual phenomenon, with four dimensions, and he has spent a long time reading the memes on Truth Social. He joins Tornike Metreveli to explain why a platform one hundredth the size of X matters, and why he still refuses to call any of it fascism.

The guest and the episode

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas, smiling, in a dark blue shirt.
Photo: Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, Georgetown University (berkleycenter.georgetown.edu).

Dr Daniel Nilsson DeHanas is Reader in Politics and Religion in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at King’s College London. He took his PhD in sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and has held positions at Bristol and the University of Kent, a research affiliation with SOAS and a Fulbright Fellowship in Finland. He co-edits the journal Religion, State and Society, and his books include London Youth, Religion, and Politics (Oxford University Press, 2016) and the edited volume Religion and the Rise of Populism (Routledge), with Marat Shterin. The chapter discussed in this episode is “The Second Coming of Donald Trump”, published in March 2026.

DeHanas does not reduce populist support to economic grievance or cultural backlash, and he will not call it fascism either, on the grounds that fascism is the wrong tool for something organised around the people rather than around the state. What he proposes instead is that populism carries a spiritual dimension that is real rather than metaphorical, and that it can be studied with the ordinary instruments of the sociology of religion. His framework sets out four dimensions. The sacred, which he holds to be present in every populist movement everywhere, defines a people and a homeland as inviolable. The charismatic runs through a leader whose appeal is personal and, in Weber’s sense, almost supernatural. The redemptive and the apocalyptic both concern the future, the first promising a utopia and the second warning of an existential threat. Trump, in his reading, scores highest on the charismatic and the apocalyptic together.

The apocalyptic dimension does the heavy lifting, and DeHanas is careful about what it means. It is not fearmongering. It is a sense that the future is closing in, and the political consequence is permission: a leader working in an apocalyptic frame is licensed to act more drastically, because the times are held to warrant it. That reading gives the 2024 campaign a different shape from 2016, from the retribution language to the choice of Waco for the first rally, thirty years after the siege. It also explains the appeal of the King Cyrus prophecy, which solves the problem of Trump’s personal conduct by casting him as an outsider whom God uses rather than a believer who must be good.

The chapter’s own contribution is about memes, and this is where DeHanas is most careful. He does not claim that memes cause violence. He claims that they build the context in which an action makes sense, slowly, through repetition, until a thing that was once extreme becomes a new normal. Truth Social is roughly one per cent the size of X, and he insists on keeping that in proportion, while arguing that what circulates there renews Trump’s charismatic authority continuously. His closing answer is unexpectedly modest. Asked what helps, he does not name a policy. He names people who can speak religious language fluently and change its terms from the inside.

Click here to listen to the episode in your own app.

The episode was released on 30 April 2026. Running time around 33 minutes.

Transcript

The transcript has been edited for readability. Filler, false starts and repetitions have been removed. Wording is otherwise the speakers’ own.

Tornike Metreveli: Hello and welcome to Religion in Praxis. We start today from a puzzle: What if the most important things happening in American politics right now are not necessarily economic but spiritual? Not in a metaphorical sense, but in a literal one. My guest today has been studying what he calls the spiritual dimension of populism, and he argues that we are missing the story.

My guest is Dr Daniel Nilsson DeHanas, a sociologist and Reader in Politics and Religion at King’s College London. He completed his PhD at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, has held research affiliations with SOAS in London and has held numerous positions at different universities, including Bristol and the University of Kent, and held a Fulbright Fellowship in Finland. His work focuses on religion and populism, Muslim politics in transnational context, and the role of media in shaping political authority. He is also co-editor of the journal Religion, State and Society, and teaches global politics, religion and media both at undergraduate and postgraduate level. Daniel, we are very happy to welcome you to the show. Thank you for joining us.

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: It’s a real pleasure. Thanks for the kind introduction.

What spiritual populism means

Tornike Metreveli: Before we get into the weeds, listeners need the orienting frame. When you say populism has a spiritual dimension, what do you actually mean? A lot of people will hear that word and assume you are talking about churchgoing, maybe churchgoing evangelicals voting Republican, but you are saying something different.

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: I am saying something different. I am saying that there is something about populism which goes beyond the rational, that people are not voting, or following populist movements, or going to rallies, because of some aspect of their own economic self-interest. There is something special, something that is emotional, but even more than emotional, something transcendent that happens in these populist spaces. If you have been to a Trump rally, or if you look at images of Trump rallies, you can see that people have a sense of awe and excitement, and you can see in their eyes that something is really going on there. That is what I am trying to study.

From 2016 to 2024, and the turn to retribution

Tornike Metreveli: Can you give us the trajectory? How did you get into this research? Was there a moment, a meme, a rally or a conversation where you thought, there is something here that standard frameworks are not catching?

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: I did my studies in the United States and I moved to London in 2007. With that election between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, I had a strong expectation. I remember teaching my students that Hillary Clinton had a big lead in that election. I was quite surprised.

Tornike Metreveli: Both of us, I think.

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: A huge surprise for so many people. I remember feeling, why would the Republicans choose Trump? He does not seem like the right candidate. It seems like a big mistake. But many of us were wrong. Beyond that particular election, I increasingly had a sense that the religious world, and aspects of the US that I remembered from when I lived there, were changing under my feet. Every time I learned about developments in politics, they seemed stranger or more different than I expected. That realisation led me to this research.

Tornike Metreveli: Take me back to 2016. Were you shocked by the scale of the evangelical Trump support? At what point did you realise that something qualitatively different was happening in 2024 compared with the earlier campaigns? You use the language of “second coming”, which I find very interesting for our religious practices context. Why that framing, and what is the distinction between 2024 and 2016?

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: In 2016, something that was shocking for many people was that 81 per cent of [white] evangelicals voted for Donald Trump. There was a lot of post-mortem explanation and trying to understand that, and we can talk about that more. But 2024 felt significantly different. A big part of that is that Donald Trump’s campaign was more focused on revenge, as everybody will know from observing the campaign. That was sometimes personal, against certain political enemies or legal enemies. But also, in his first announcement that he was running for president, he said something about, “I am your retribution”. So he is taking other people up with him across the United States and saying that we are going to fight this and right the wrongs that you faced before.

Very significantly, he chose to put his first campaign rally in Waco, Texas, which is where exactly 30 years earlier the Branch Davidians had a confrontation with the FBI. The Branch Davidians are a new religious movement that could be considered a cult, and that confrontation resulted in a big fire after a long siege, which killed about 80 people. So there is something he was doing by placing a rally in Waco, saying that I am on the side of those who are mavericks, who are doing something different, those who are fighting against the deep state, those who have new religious ideas. The tone of the campaign in 2024 felt very different.

The four dimensions

Tornike Metreveli: Let’s get into the framework you have built to make sense of it. You argue that spiritual populism has four dimensions: sacred, charismatic, redemptive, apocalyptic. Can you walk us through them and give listeners an example as you go? Trump, Meloni, or whoever lands cleanest.

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: I would be happy to. The idea is that populism has a spiritual nature to it, the way that we see populism in the world today, and that there are four different ways we can see this.

The first would be the sacred dimension. The sacred side of it means that every populist leader and every populist movement is trying to define itself around the idea that the people themselves and their wishes are sacred. The people tend to be defined in some nativist or ethnic or national way, so that they exclude others, which might be immigrants or Muslims or whoever else. The idea is that these people have a heritage and a homeland that is being stolen from under their feet, and that it needs to be defended at all costs. So there’s a sacredness to this sense of populism. I think that applies to every single populist and populist movement everywhere. Any time there is a fight around borders, for example, borders are considered sacred. This is our nation, these are our borders.

Secondly, we have charismatic populism. By far most populists nowadays are charismatic, or have a charismatic leader. The idea here is that there is a personal magnetism, something that draws you to that person, that appeal that makes you think this person is set apart, they are different, there is something special, almost supernatural in the way that they speak, which is actually the language that Max Weber, the sociologist, used when he was classically defining this.

Quote card: Max Weber's definition of charisma, from The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.

You can easily see that when you see Narendra Modi, the leader of India, speak. He speaks and acts in quite a Hindu way, and he is a kind of guru as well as a speaker, so people give him great credence. They come to his rallies and think he is magnetic.

Then we have the redemptive dimension and the apocalyptic dimension, and these are more about the future. Some populists focus more on the redemptive dimension. The idea is that there is a way in which you as the people will be saved, that something about your history is coming together and we can bring society to a new place that is good, like a utopia. You can sometimes see that through Marine Le Pen and the way that she speaks about the future. You could certainly see it through Hugo Chávez, the previous leader of Venezuela. He had a sense that he was almost Jesus Christ himself, bringing a great future to his people.

Finally we have the apocalyptic dimension. Again this is about the future, but this is when the future is really dark. There is a sense that the people are threatened, that there is something existential, something about their existence which is under threat, and that if they do not expel the foreigners, if they do not make a choice to go to war, if they do not do something really drastic, then we are going to end up losing them entirely. This is the least frequent. But you do see it sometimes with Erdoğan in Turkey. Sometimes he has talked in an apocalyptic way about moving the embassy to Israel, to the outside of Israel itself, to the West Bank. And you see it, of course, with Donald Trump pre-eminently.

Tornike Metreveli: You say that Trump scores especially high on the apocalyptic and charismatic axes. What does that actually look like in practice? I want to be careful here, because apocalyptic is not just fearmongering. Help us see the difference.

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: Trump scores high on charismatic in the view of those who are following him, and he also scores very highly on apocalyptic. Apocalyptic is not just about fear or a sense of terror. It is about a sense that the future is closing in, that we are in the end times, and that means that everything is at stake. When everything is at stake, either literally in a religious sense because Jesus is coming soon, or even in a figurative sense where you just have this sense of urgency and maybe nuclear war is merited, there are a lot of motifs around the end of the world which have a real heightened danger to them. In either case, a leader who uses apocalyptic populism is licensed to make more drastic choices, to act on behalf of the people with a real aggressiveness which recognises the danger of the times.

What economics and culture miss

Tornike Metreveli: Here is where the arguments get really sharp. The standard explanations are economic grievance and cultural backlash, left-behind voters, status anxiety… You are saying that they do not fully explain Trump. What do they miss? And do supporters experience this as religion itself, or is it operating below the surface? Is it cultivated from the top, or emerging from below?

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: There are many different types of Trump supporter and we could talk through some of them. One of the main dynamics I see is that Trump’s candidacy created a kind of religion-like fervour. There has been some really interesting research, for example, showing that in places like in the Rust Belt, in the Midwest, places with both a sense of decline in terms of their economics and a sense of religious decline, where churches were closing, those were places where Trump did especially well. So there is a way in which he actually channelled the energy that was going away from churches and into himself.

There are lots of different sides of this at play. Trump is an expert communicator. He has been a television personality for a long time. Part of this is him taking on certain constituencies, choosing people who are on the religious side and learning from them about their communication style, essentially mastering that, or having proxies who help him bring in different sorts of religious voters. But more than anything, there is something about his personal magnetism and the way that he has channelled it, which has hit the US at the right moment to bring a great following that is not just about economics but feels special.

Prophecy voters and the New Apostolic Reformation

Tornike Metreveli: You break Trump’s evangelical base into four categories: value voters, nostalgia voters, prophecy voters and QAnon voters. I wanted to ask you about the prophecy voters, which I find particularly interesting, because this is the constituency I think most listeners know least about. The New Apostolic Reformation. What makes it politically powerful in a way that, say, traditional Southern Baptists are not?

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: You will remember that earlier I said I left the US and then felt like everything was changing under my feet while I was away in the UK. The thing that has changed the most is that the fastest growing group of Christians in America is what you can think of as independent network charismatics. Another way of thinking about them is prophecy voters, or prophecy-oriented charismatic or Pentecostal Christians.

What is special is that they tend to be independent. They are not part of particular known denominational networks, but they emphasise the role of prophecy, and of apostles as mediators of that prophecy. The idea is that just as there was an apostle Paul, there are apostles today who can speak with that same kind of authority and leadership direction. This is an important movement, and the most well known component of it, although you are right that listeners may not know it, is the New Apostolic Reformation, which has developed since the 1990s. It is relatively, I would not say secretive, but we do not always know who all of the many different leaders are, although they are deeply connected by networks.

What is really distinctive is that not only are they prophetic, but they prophesy a kind of theology or idea that Christians should seek out dominion. There is a kind of dominionism, that Christians should be working for success in this world and thinking about their gains in terms of money and in terms of power as something which God is authorising. There is a way in which this is not really a gospel of grace. It is not just the same as a prosperity gospel either, because it is not really about individual success, but more about the collective sense of all Christians being demonstrated through gains in the world. And that itself can bring the end times, and can bring the kingdom of heaven to earth.

Tornike Metreveli: Names like Lance Wallnau and Paula White are not necessarily known to many people listening. How do these speakers actually shape the theology? What is the mechanism by which a prophecy goes from one preacher’s word to a movement’s conviction? And how many people are we actually talking about? Because the cultural footprint feels much bigger than the membership numbers.

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: There are some key people in this and you have named a couple of them, and for listeners it is best to focus on them. Although I would say that if you really are interested in this, there is another podcast called Charismatic Revival Fury, which gets into this in a lot of detail, and Matthew Taylor has written a great book called The Violent Take It by Force, which talks about these groups.

Paula White is a great example. She has been Trump’s spiritual advisor, so she had an official role, and that is why he has brought so many people from this movement into his orbit. The main way she has operated is as a kind of authoriser of relationships for Trump. But probably the more interesting and representative example would be Lance Wallnau, because he has been extremely successful at shaping the ideas and shaping the theology. He is one of two or three people who came up with this idea that Trump is a new King Cyrus.

Trump as King Cyrus, and what happens when prophecies fail

Tornike Metreveli: That is so interesting. Can you walk us through it? What work does it do theologically?

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: There is an idea that a few people had a vision at the same time, that Trump is a new King Cyrus. King Cyrus is a character from the Hebrew scriptures, or the Old Testament. The idea here is that he was someone who was not part of the people of God. He was not one of the Hebrews, or one of the people we write into the history of Christians. Instead he was a secular person who favoured the people of God at the time. There are various ways in which he helped them to prosper and became a kind of surrogate for them.

The "Cyrus Trump" prayer coin sold on the Jim Bakker Show in 2019.
The “Cyrus Trump” prayer coin, sold for $45 on the Jim Bakker Show in May 2019, with Lance Wallnau calling it a “point of contact” with God. Isaiah 45:1 addresses Cyrus, a Persian king who did not worship Israel’s God, as the Lord’s anointed. Hence the price: Isaiah 45, and Trump as the forty-fifth president. Screenshot from the Jim Bakker Show, via Religion News Service.

So the idea here is that Donald Trump does not have to measure up to a certain level of moral rectitude, or anything like that, to be someone who is powerful and acts on behalf of Christians and of Christianity. He becomes a kind of sponsor, even if he does not actually embody the values themselves. This gives a kind of moral licence. You can feel, “all right, I can vote for Trump. It is actually an ethical thing to vote for a very unethical man”, some people might say, because of the way that he is opening the door for so many of these wonderful ethical people, opening the doors for evangelicals, or for charismatics, to really reshape society.

Tornike Metreveli: Thank you for clarifying that. The obvious question for me is, how do we believers square that with Trump’s unconventional personal life? And what happens to the movement when the prophecies fail, because they do fail. What sort of thinking or conversation is there afterwards?

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: In terms of squaring this with his personal life, people have given him a lot of leeway. I also think that is true for prophecies. There is a certain sense in which people of God, or people who are part of this story in the Bible, get things wrong, and that is all right. Here is where grace does come in. A lot of Christians have given Donald Trump a lot of grace and space to be himself, to be a different sort of character.

I do think that in his current term of office, and we are more than one year into his second term of office, he is doing more things that are dangerous but also considered mistakes. One of the classic ones is that he posted an image of himself as Jesus Christ. The more that he does things like this, which cross a red line, the more he will alienate elements of his base. They held on to him quite firmly, because in their sense the good so much outnumbers the bad, and the alternatives are cast as almost demonic, as much worse. If you had a Democrat in power, it would be a much starker reality. Overall I would say that people have given a lot of wiggle room to Donald Trump to be a different type of president.

AI-generated image of Trump in a white robe and red sash, posted on Truth Social in April 2026.
Trump posted this AI-generated image of himself in a white robe and red sash on Truth Social on 12 April 2026, and it was deleted within a day. He confirmed posting it, saying he thought it showed him as a doctor rather than Jesus. Image: Truth Social, @realDonaldTrump.

QAnon, memes and the legitimation of violence

Tornike Metreveli: And then there is QAnon, which starts somewhere different from evangelical theology and then somehow merges with it. How does that happen, and how does a conspiracy theory get spiritualised? This echoes your ongoing research and the broader thread in your work. Give us the gist of that mechanism, and then we will go to the violence question.

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: QAnon is really interesting. The idea is that there is a poster, somebody who posts things online, or did, named Q, an anonymous person. The idea is that they have Q-level military clearance, so they are able to see the secrets within the “deep state” or within the military and other aspects of the US government. Q had been making posts which were very Trump-supportive, with the sense that Trump was somebody who as president was able to find the links of conspiracy and bring people to justice.

The main conspiracy that Q focuses on is that there is a dark cabal or secret network, including people like Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama and George Soros, the Jewish philanthropist, who have a child sex trafficking ring. These people are doing the worst kind of wrong imaginable and need to be brought to justice. Part of Q’s theology and set of ideas, which completely emerged online and became an online movement, is the idea that these people should be rounded up and summarily executed, that there is a coming storm, and when they are executed, that will be the sign that God, or some spiritual goodness, has happened. So it is a very dark theological idea.

It comes from the internet in a way where it could be a mixture of a kind of dark humour, or it could be a very legitimate thing. Nobody knows exactly who this poster is, but they created a cultural movement around that 2016 election and the aftermath, which got a lot of people interested. A lot of people did their own research to learn about this and joined this loose network of online people following these posts and spiritualising them, seeing something spiritual in them. The only other thing to say is that some of these people became very prominent in the attack on the Capitol in January 2021, when Trump and his followers wanted to contest the election. If you remember the images of a man with bison horns and a spear, that is somebody called the Q Shaman, who was very much a follower of QAnon.

Jake Angeli holding a QAnon sign in Peoria, Arizona, in October 2020.
Jake Angeli, later known as Q Shaman or Jacob Chansley, holding a QAnon sign in Peoria, Arizona, in October 2020, three months before the Capitol storming. Photo: TheUnseen011101, public domain.

Tornike Metreveli: I want to handle the next question carefully, because it is where the stakes get real. You are scrupulous in the chapter, as I said, that you do not say memes cause violence, but you do say they can legitimate it. I wonder where is that line exactly, and how do you as a researcher hold both halves of it?

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: Memes are fascinating because they are an aspect of culture. Memes do not generally tell you what to do, but they create a wider context in which what you are doing makes sense. Obviously most memes that we see online are funny. They are there to make us laugh, and people can riff off them and play with them in ways that work with the same material and continue to make the joke work.

But the memes that we see on somewhere like Truth Social, where I have spent a lot of time online, are generally not funny. They are much more serious, even severe, because they are focused on the importance of what Donald Trump is doing. They often pitch him as a kind of saviour, or someone who could wreak vengeance in society. What I would say is that memes create a cultural framework, and that they work in a subtle way, in a subversive way, over a long period of time, because those who immerse themselves online see lots and lots of memes, and versions of the same meme, so that certain things become a new normal for them. QAnon memes will normalise ideas around Q and the coming storm, which are inherently violent. Other sorts of memes that are supportive of Trump might be a bit more creative or original, but they will at least uphold the sense of his authority and his need to be followed.

Keeping it in proportion

Tornike Metreveli: What worries you most about apocalyptic imagery moving from the fringe into mainstream political communication? And a practical question for everyone listening: how should journalists, scholars and platforms cover this without amplifying it? Are there historical parallels that help us see the risks?

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: Something that we need to do is keep it in perspective. It is worth knowing that Truth Social, where these memes are most recurrent, is about one per cent the size of X. You will see memes like the ones I am discussing on X as well, but I am often looking at a quite fervent core base, people who are really excited about a set of ideas. That still means they are important, and I would not want to downgrade their importance, but let us keep it in proportion. It is certainly not everyone.

In terms of moving this forward, I do think we are in really different conversations, in different bubbles separate from each other, so it is quite hard in some ways to communicate in ways that make a difference. In a lot of ways I feel like a spectator. I just watch these and see what is happening. But the people who I would say are most well placed to make a difference in these conversations are those who can speak religious language very effectively.

Two people come to mind just now. One, of course, is Pope Leo, who has been speaking very effectively at a very high level with Donald Trump and the vice president and others. Another is a candidate for senator whom you may have heard of, named James Talarico, who went to seminary and is able to speak absolutely in an evangelical discourse, but to change the terms of it in some fascinating ways. There is a New Testament quote that you may be familiar with about how God is neither male nor female, and he has actually said that God is non-binary, which is quite a radical thing to say. But more than that, he has been able to show a kind of love and care and grace in his communication, and a fluency with religious language, which I think if we had more people able to do it, we would be in a different situation.

Spiritual populism, or just fascism?

Tornike Metreveli: A sceptic listening to this might say: does calling this spiritual risk letting cynical, manipulative leaders off the hook? It sounds almost respectful. How do you hold the analytical category without granting it a dignity it does not deserve?

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: I see what you mean. Let me start with something similar. I study populism, I am really interested in populism, and sometimes people have said that we should not call it populism, we should call it fascism. I do not want to get into the details of that debate, but I actually think what I study is populism. It is focused on the people, and I think calling it fascism is using the wrong tool to study what it is. In a similar way, I am trying to study spiritual populism, because I think that there is something real happening that draws on a spiritual side to human beings. And because that is happening, we can use the tools of sociology of religion and other ways that we have studied religion to come to understand it better. So I am trying to use the right term for it.

I think it has sometimes been a problem that calling something populism has been embraced by these leaders, and maybe calling it spiritual populism could do something similar. If that is the case, then I just think we have to use the right ideas but get to the nub of the idea, and get better at arguing when we are at the centre of the idea.

Tornike Metreveli: Maybe two last questions. Are younger evangelicals resisting this turn or absorbing it? And the speculative one, with the obvious caveat that nobody knows: does this wave keep building, or does it burn itself out?

Daniel Nilsson DeHanas: I would say that this is still a sizeable, shifting and dynamic group of churches and leaders and online movements. The direction of change in America tends to be towards less religiosity. That is absolutely happening. But somehow that has not shifted politics in the ways that researchers had expected.

So the prospects for the future are that maybe people will get tired of the high intensity of this kind of populist religious life. I think that did happen in Trump’s previous term, and I would not be surprised if the pendulum swings a bit to some kind of more mainstream leader for the next president, because in a certain sense the apocalyptic mood is something that can only be sustained for so long. My greatest hope, because I do not think the apocalyptic mood is a good thing, is that people will tire of it, or find better arguments against it.

Tornike Metreveli: And on this note we will finish. Thank you very much, Daniel. It was wonderful talking to you.

Follow the show

Religion in Praxis is on Spotify, Apple Podcasts and every other major podcast app. Click here to find it in yours.

To propose a guest or an episode, write to tornike.metreveli@eu.lu.se. If you spot an error in the transcript, write to shota.hintsagty@eu.lu.se.

If you enjoyed the show, don’t forget to share it around!

Author

Leave a Reply